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Abstract
An ideographic concept of character is indispensable to phylogenetic inference. Hennig proposed that characters be
conceptualized as ‘‘transformation series’’, a proposal that is firmly grounded in evolutionary theory and consistent with the
method of inferring transformation events as evidence of phylogenetic propinquity. Nevertheless, that concept is usually overlooked
or rejected in favor of others based on similarity. Here we explicate Hennig’s definition of character as an ideographic concept in the
science of phylogenetic systematics. As transformation series, characters are historical individuals akin to species and clades. As
such, the related concept of homology refers to a historical identity relation and is not equivalent to or synonymous with
synapomorphy. The distinction between primary and secondary homology is dismissed on the grounds that it conflates the concept
of homology with the discovery operations used to detect instances of that concept. Although concern for character dependence is
generally valid, it is often misplaced, focusing on functional or developmental correlation (both of which are irrelevant in
phylogenetic systematics but may be valid in other fields) instead of the historical ⁄ transformational independence relevant to
phylogenetic inference. As an ideographic science concerned with concrete objects and events (i.e. individuals), intensionally and
extensionally defined properties are inconsistent with the individuation of characters for phylogenetic analysis, the utility of
properties being limited to communicating results and facilitating future rounds of testing.
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Introduction
Ordinary discourse is made difficult by the many
meanings of the word character, as seen in the Oxford
English Dictionary. The difficulty is no less in particular
fields of science. For example, Colless’s (1985, p. 230)
survey of over 50 books and articles revealed the
following explicitly stated, or implied, meanings of
character in systematics: ‘‘an attribute, a set of attrib-
utes, a feature, a characteristic, a property, a part, a
morphocline, a differentia, an homology, a truth, a
theory, an aspect (of an organism), a basis for compar-
ison, a similarity, and (mathematically) a variable, a
function, a mapping, an equivalence relation, and a set
of probability distributions.’’ Colless (p. 231) even
added Hennig’s (1966) definition of character to his list,
as ‘‘transformation series’’, interpreting Hennig to have
meant ‘‘a set of mutually exclusive character conditions
or special characters’’. Thus it is that many evolution-
ary biologists, including many phylogeneticists, have
failed to understand Hennig’s concept of character—‘‘a
historical event in the evolution of a feature’’ (Fristrup,
1992, p. 45), or as Hennig (1966; p. 93; see also
preceding text, beginning on p. 88) clarified:1
Different characters that are to be regarded as transformation
stages of the same original character are generally called
homologous. ‘‘Transformation’’ naturally refers to real histor-
ical processes of evolution, and not to the possibility of formally
deriving characters from one another in the sense of idealistic
morphology.
*Corresponding author. Division of Vertebrate Zoology, Herpe-
tology, American Museum of Natural History, New York, NY 10024,
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1Note that Hennig’s (1966) usage of ‘‘character’’ as a discrete
stage—minimally a singular heritable event—in a transformation series
is equivalent to the conventional usage of ‘‘character-state’’. As such,
his ‘‘transformation series’’ is equivalent to what is conventionally
referred to as ‘‘character’’.
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Moreover, many contemporary workers seem entirely
unaware of Hennig’s character concept. A recent multi-
authored book (Wagner, 2001) dedicated to elucidating
the concept of character in evolutionary biology over-
looked Hennig’s transformation series, as did two
philosophical papers (Richards, 2002, 2003) that specif-
ically examined character concepts in phylogenetic
systematics. Overlooking or misunderstanding this con-
cept of character has resulted in significant confusion,
with far-reaching implications for empirical phylo-
genetic studies. We believe the most significant level of
confusion is between a similarity- or property-based
concept of character, as per Colless’s list, and character
as a series of singular historical events (Platnick, 1979).
Hennig’s definition is clearly grounded in evolutionary
theory, whereas the other definitions are not.
In this paper we explicate the concept of character
required of a consistent approach to historical evolu-
tionary biology. By this we mean an approach in which
there are no apparent negations or contradictions among
the concepts and discovery operations that lead to
objective knowledge claims. Most of our views can be
traced toHennig (1966), who in turn drew fromWoodger
(1929, 1952), among others, albeit with numerous tech-
nical clarifications admitted over the years. Our under-
lying premise is that concepts matter; they determine
which observations are scientifically relevant and how
they may be processed in order to make consistent
inferences. Only after theoretically defined concepts have
been established, such as the concept of character, can
valid discovery operations be developed and implemen-
ted in empirical research (Grant, 2002).
Transformation
Evolutionary biology is concerned with heritable
change. Darwin’s (1859, p. 420) theory of ‘‘descent,
with modification’’, specifies transformation from ances-
tral to derived conditions (a fi a¢ fi a¢¢, etc., where
fi is a transformation event that may involve the
modification of a complex phenotypic character or the
substitution, insertion, or deletion of a nucleotide) as the
explanation of all heritable variation among living
things; molecular genetics identifies transformations of
DNA as the primary source of heritable variation; and
those molecular transformations involve interactions
governed ultimately by quantum physics (Stamos,
2001). Because all transformation involves the modifi-
cation of an existing condition, the course of evolution
and the diversification of life are, at least to some degree,
a function of historical contingency (historical preced-
ence, historicity, phylogenetic conservatism). As Hull
(1988, p. 424) observed, ‘‘[t]he past constrains the future
only to the extent that it has structured the present’’, and
that requires the genetic and developmental integration
of the ancestral phenotype. Thus, while history is not
predictive of diversity because of its necessarily unique
nature, it may nonetheless be understood as constrain-
ing the genotype (and phenotype) by having limited the
possible transformations.
Many different aspects of heritable transformation
may be studied under the rubric of evolutionary biology,
and the validity of the various scientific approaches
depends on which aspect is the subject of inquiry. For
example, research that focuses on the results or effects of
transformation events may investigate the universal
statistical principles that govern the spread of trans-
formed character-states through populations, which can
inform predictive models of population genetics, or may
examine the adaptive or deleterious effects of particular
transformations in functional terms. The emphasis
placed on such studies in the Modern Synthesis has
resulted in the familiar textbook definition of evolution
as ‘‘change in allele frequency’’. Although that popula-
tion-level definition is certainly descriptive of an evolu-
tionary process, it is a grossly biased definition, because
it overlooks many other fundamental aspects of trans-
formation in evolution. For example, molecular evolu-
tionary studies investigate the mechanisms that underlie
different classes of transformations of DNA, such as
insertions and deletions, point mutations, and gene
rearrangements. In addition, phylogenetic systematics
focuses on the history of the transformation events
themselves as evidence of phylogenetic relationships, as
is evident in the patristic relationship function. As Farris
(1967, p. 47) described it, ‘‘The overall patristic differ-
ence is the sum of the patristic unit character differences.
Each patristic unit character difference is the summation
of the changes of that character from point to point over
the phyletic line between the populations compared.’’
Due in large part to the reductionist zeal of the Modern
Synthesis to force all evolutionary biology into a single
inferential framework, the distinct epistemological con-
straints associated with each kind of problem continue
to be overlooked by many workers (Siddall and Kluge,
1997).
Phylogenetic systematics stands in contraposition to
most areas of evolutionary biology in that it is explicitly
and exclusively historical—it is ideographic. It does not
predict evolutionary changes into the future (although it
may be predictive of past events not yet detected, i.e.
retrodictive), and it does not conjecture universal
laws—it is not nomothetic. Instead, it seeks to provide
ideographic explanations of the heritable variation
observed among lineages related through phylogeny
(as opposed to ontogeny or tokogeny) by discovering
the series of necessarily unique historical transformation
events that occurred during their evolution, where
phylogenetic hypotheses are chosen on the basis of the
number of independent transformation events (patristic
distance) required by the competing propositions
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(Farris, 1967, 1970). That is, phylogenetic systematists
use historical transformation events as evidence of
phylogenetic propinquity.
The transformationist basis of phylogenetic methods
contrasts with phenetic approaches where organisms are
classified according to some necessarily arbitrary meas-
ure of similarity (e.g. Rieppel and Kearney, 2002; see
Kluge, 2003b). Failure to recognize the fundamental
distinction between transformation and similarity as the
basis for delimiting groups has led some phylogeneticists
to mistakenly use phenetic methods to infer phylogeny
(Farris, 1967). This is obvious in the case of explicitly
similarity-based (albeit weighted) distance methods like
minimum evolution and neighbor joining, but it is also
true of other methods. For example, three-taxon ana-
lysis is based on similarity (Kluge and Farris, 1999), as is
the derivative method RASA (Faivovich, 2002; Farris,
2002). Likewise, methods that convert polymorphism
into separate, ‘‘polymorphic’’ states or frequencies allow
populations to be grouped on the basis of more precise
descriptions of similarity, but they mistakenly equate
population-level similarity with transformation events
(Grant and Kluge, 2003). Only the transformation from
one character-state to another, a fi a¢, constitutes evi-
dence in phylogenetic inference; changes in frequency
(including extinction) of states in populations do not
entail additional character-state transformations and are
therefore evidentially irrelevant. Two populations char-
acterized as aa¢ are certainly more similar to each other
than they are to uniformly a or a¢ populations, but they
are not delimited as a distinct group by any transfor-
mation event, since the only transformation was from a
to a¢. In summary, the fact that phylogenetic inferences
are based on transformation events determines the kinds
of observations that constitute evidence of relationship.2
Characters as historical individuals
Although transformation events constitute the rele-
vant units of evolutionary change in phylogenetics, there
must be some ‘‘thing’’ in existence to undergo transfor-
mation. Lineages are usually understood as being
composed ultimately of individual organisms (see Frost
and Kluge, 1994). Although transformations are neces-
sarily manifested physically as organisms (sensu lato; e.g.
Wilson and Sober, 1994), the organism is not the basic
unit of evolutionary transformation. Instead, the indi-
vidual parts of organisms undergo transformation,
which justifies decomposing organisms into independ-
ently variable character-states to test phylogenetic
hypotheses. That an organism transforms by time-
ordered changes in different parts, rather than by a
whole stage in the lifecycle replacing another, is evidence
enough to validate the individuation of transformations
at the sub-organism level.
This sub-organism focus does not deny the import-
ance of organisms in evolutionary biology and phylo-
genetic inference: the fact that the elements of evolution
are effectively ‘‘bundled’’ into organisms, family groups,
demes, populations, and phylogenetic lineages places
important constraints on both the way they evolve and
the valid inferences that can be made about them.
Indeed, it is because they are bundled in this way that
the series of transformations of individual parts are
attributed evidential significance in the inference of
phylogeny (Hennig, 1966).
Character-states have generally been conceptualized
as properties (attributes, features), which logically
denies their ability to transform or evolve, since prop-
erties are class concepts and, as such, are immutable
(Kluge, 2003b). Only individuals (in the ontological
sense) can undergo change. In the same way that species
and clades are conceptualized as increasingly inclusive
historical individuals linked by a series of unique
diversification events (Kluge, 1990; Grant, 2002), we
propose that heritable variations among organisms be
conceptualized as increasingly inclusive historical indi-
viduals linked by a series of transformation events, i.e.
the transformation series of Hennig (1966). Unfortu-
nately, there are those who distort the notion of
individuals and classes, so that everything is a class.
For example, Boyd (1999) has argued that species are
homeostatic cluster kinds; however, in being homeo-
static, such kinds cannot evolve (Kluge, 2003a, p. 234).
Since Ghiselin’s (1974) ‘‘radical solution’’ (see also
Hennig, 1966, pp. 80–83, who argued strongly for the
same solution), the biological literature has swelled with
discussions of ontological individuality. For the present
purposes, two kinds of individuals are distinguished (see
Kluge, 1990; Grant, 2002). Contemporary individuals are
united by both a common, unique history and cohesive
and integrative processes (or, in Hennig’s terms, they
form a divisional hierarchy and are also operational
units). For example, the unity of an organism, such as
Darrel Frost, is due to both the historical connections
among semaphoronts (e.g. Frost in different stages of his
ontogeny) and the cohesive and integrative processes
operating presently. In contrast, historical individuals are
2Other kinds of data have been proposed as evidence of
phylogenetic relationships, such as relative age of origin or strati-
graphic position. However, for there to be a direct evidential
connection between observed variation of any kind and lineage
diversification there must be heritability, and that is not a character-
istic of stratigraphic data. Furthermore, the truism that ancestors
precede their descendents is only sufficient to establish a linear
temporal order, whereas transformation series are inclusively hierar-
chic. For additional issues in this debate see Fisher (1994), Fox et al.
(1999), Heyning et al. (1999), Vermeij (1999, 2001), Smith (2000),
Bodenbender and Fisher (2001), Brochu et al. (2001), Geiger et al.
(2001), Novacek (2001), Sumrall and Brochu (2003), and Fisher and
Bodenbender (2003).
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united only by common history, not current processes
(i.e. they ‘‘lack the character operational unit’’; Hennig,
1966, p. 83). The unity of a monophyletic group, such as
Squamata, is exclusively historical; it is neither united by
nor involved in cohesive and integrative processes. Just as
there are many kinds of contemporary individuals (con-
sider the ontological differences between, say, an individ-
ual atom and an individual galaxy), there are many kinds
of historical individuals. In phylogenetic systematics, two
kinds of historical individuals are relevant: those that are
the result of lineage diversification events (and are
therefore related by phylogeny), and those that are the
result of heritable transformation events. Within this
framework, character-states are defined conceptually as
the least inclusive historical individuals that result from
heritable transformation events.
It is common for character-states to be defined
conceptually as purely observational statements, but
they are complex, theory-laden hypotheses of historical
identity—no less hypothetical than the characters and
more inclusive historical individuals of which they are
part. What is actually observed are the parts of an
individual organism, yet those parts can be individuated
according to a variety of criteria, each of which may be
relevant to a given problem or in a particular inferential
context. Structurally, the basic parts are the fundamen-
tal particles of physics (quarks, leptons, photons,
gluons, W-bosons, and Z-bosons), although biological
problems may treat cells as structurally basic; develop-
mentally, they are the parts united by independent
ontogenetic pathways (note that these basic units are
also historical individuals); and functionally, they are
the operationally independent structures involved in
certain processes. That is, independence is context-
dependent (e.g. the fact that a single observer scores all
terminals renders all entries non-independent in that
context), so the context must be specified for relevant
independence to be assessed. Because the basic or
fundamental unit in phylogenetic inference is the trans-
formation event, the relevant independent parts of
organisms are those that have undergone independent,
heritable transformation events. What matters in indi-
viduating character-states (and more inclusive transfor-
mation series), therefore, is not the structural,
developmental, or functional independence of a part,
but its historical ⁄ transformational independence.
That character-states are much more than direct
observations is clarified by considering the variation
observed among organisms that is subsumed within a
given character-state. With the exception of some kinds
of molecular characters, for which character-states are
precisely delimited in terms of physico-chemical struc-
ture, a strict application of the observational character-
state concept would result in a different character-state
for every specimen examined, because, as any morphol-
ogist can attest (e.g. Hennig, 1966, p. 37), there is always
some degree of individual variation. However, given
that character-states are conjectured historical individ-
uals, only variation attributable to heritable transfor-
mation events is relevant; any variation judged to be
non-heritable (i.e. due to environmental factors, not
heritable transformations) is defensibly excluded as
evidentially irrelevant. Any such claim is empirically
testable, and it may be found in future rounds of testing
(e.g. through the examination of additional specimens,
more precise measurement, direct experimentation) that
the original individuation of character-states was inad-
equate, arbitrary, or otherwise false and must therefore
be modified. Fallibility does not equate with subjectiv-
ity, however, and the procedure of testing and re-testing
character-state individuations is explicitly objective
(Kluge, 2003b).
As is true of other kinds of historical individuals,
character-states are parts of more inclusive historical
individuals linked through time by transformation
events, and those more inclusive historical individuals
may, in turn, be parts of even more inclusive historical
individuals. Stated differently, by definition each histor-
ical individual has its own, unique history, so each part
of a more inclusive historical individual will have its
own, particular history as well, all of which are linked
together by necessarily unique transformation events.
The dependency between such transformation series is
non-problematic, because it merely reflects the transfor-
mation event(s) they share, i.e. the shared portion of
their history (see below).
In contrast, the dependency that obtains from alter-
native descriptions of the outcome of the same trans-
formation event represents an obvious problem for
phylogenetic inference (Farris, 1983). For example, the
DNA sequences TTT, TTC, TTA and the ancestral
TTG entail a single independent transformation series
corresponding to the variable position in the aligned
sequences. TTT and TTC can also be described as the
amino acid phenylalanine, and TTA and TTG as
leucine. Consistent with the concept of ‘‘taxic homol-
ogy’’ espoused by Patterson (1982b; not to be confused
with the ‘‘taxic approach’’ of Eldredge, 1979; see Farris,
2000; Farris et al., 2001, p. 80) and others, it could be
argued that because the hierarchic affinities (relative
adjacencies) implied by these ‘‘characters’’ are distinct,
they are both valid homology statements that should be
combined to simultaneously test phylogenetic hypothe-
ses (Agosti et al., 1996; Freudenstein et al., 2003).
However, this reveals the illogic of the concept of ‘‘taxic
homology’’, given that it is obvious that these are simply
alternative descriptions of the outcome of the same
events, regardless of whether they imply the same or
different hierarchies. The relationship between TTT and
TTC as phenylalanine is one of functional equivalence,
not historical identity (homology), and while that may
be informative in other areas of inquiry (e.g. studies of
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natural selection or adaptation), it is irrelevant in
phylogenetic systematics. Moreover, the different hier-
archy (relative adjacency) implied by the amino acid
‘‘character’’ is entirely due to the imprecision imposed
by the degeneracy of the genetic code, resulting in a loss
of information on transformation events and a false
hypothesis of homology. There is a potentially infinite
number of ways to describe real entities (such as
nucleotides in DNA sequences) and rank them accord-
ing to similarity (e.g. translated amino acids; number of
rings [purine ⁄pyrimidine]; number of atoms [12 ⁄14 ⁄15];
number of carbon atoms [4 ⁄5]; number of nitrogen
atoms [2 ⁄3 ⁄5]; number of hydrogen atoms [4 ⁄5]; number
of oxygen atoms [0 ⁄1 ⁄2]; etc.). But this is only a problem
for phenetic approaches and their emphasis on similarity
and description (e.g. Rieppel and Kearney, 2002), not
phylogenetic systematics, which emphasizes transforma-
tion and explanation (e.g. Kluge, 2003b).
Homology = historical identity „ synapomorphy
Having established the conceptual relationship be-
tween transformation events and the things that are
transformed,3 we can explicate the concepts of homology
and synapomorphy. Homology refers to the relation
between parts that resulted from the same heritable
transformation event. As such, homology ¼ historical
identity, i.e. two or more parts that are homologous are
parts of the same historical individual (Kluge, 2003a,b).
However, recalling that historical individuals may be
composed of more and ⁄or less inclusive parts, two or
more parts may be homologous in one context but not in
another. The particular statement of historical identity
must therefore refer to the specific historical individual in
question, and, transitively, the relevant transformation
event. For example, bird wings and bat wings are
homologous as tetrapod fore-appendages (which refers
to a single transformation event) but not as wings (which
refers to distinct, historically unrelated transformation
events). This definition of homology as historical identity
provides a theoretical basis for the correspondence of
parts of equivalent semaphoronts, parts of the same
semaphoront (e.g. serial homologs, antimeric homologs,
duplicated genes), parts of non-equivalent semaphoronts
(e.g. sexual homologs, the adult sphenethmoid and larval
chondrocranium), and logically dependent transforma-
tion series (e.g. 1. gain or loss of limbs [present ⁄absent];
2. transformation of limb color [red ⁄blue ⁄green]; 3.
transformation of limb length [short ⁄medium ⁄ long]; 4.
transformation of number of limbs [two ⁄ four]). In each
case, independent evolutionary transformation events
determine historical identity, i.e. homology.
Synapomorphy, in contrast, refers to the shared
occurrence of a derived (apomorphic) character-state,
whether or not that shared occurrence resulted from the
same transformation event (homology) or different
transformation events. In developing his concept of
‘‘taxic homology’’, Patterson (1982b; see also de Pinna,
1991)4 equated synapomorphy and homology, a move
that logically precludes homology as an explanans of
synapomorphy. If ‘‘homology’’ ¼ ‘‘synapomorphy’’,
and ‘‘synapomorphy’’ ¼ ‘‘shared, derived character-
state’’, then, transitively, ‘‘shared derived character-
state due to homology’’ ¼ ‘‘homology due to
homology’’, a tautologous and therefore empty state-
ment. This does not mean that phylogenetic inference is
necessarily circular; however, it does mean that a new
word would have to be coined to designate the explan-
ans of synapomorphy. Of course, the meaning attached
to words is free to change, but we see nothing to be
gained by this particular semantic shift, and the
linguistic imprecision it engenders seems reason enough
to stick with the words and meanings biologists are used
to.
A further consequence of conceptualizing characters
as transformation series is that de Pinna’s (1991)
distinction between ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary’’ homol-
ogy dissolves. de Pinna (1991, p. 372) believed that
homology assessment necessarily requires separate pro-
cedures and criteria for hypothesis ‘‘generation and
legitimation’’, the former rooted in notions of similarity
and the latter based on the simultaneous test of
character congruence. However, all possible hypotheses
of homology are defined a priori by pure logic alone as a
function of the number of heritable parts identified for
each terminal (cf. Wheeler, 1998), just as all possible
hypotheses of phylogeny are pre-defined as a function of
3Of course, this was already clarified by Hennig (1966, p. 89), who
cautioned, ‘‘we must always be aware of the fact that characters that
can be compared are basically only character conditions that the real
process of evolution produced by transformation of an original
condition.’’ Generalizing further, Woodger (1929, pp. 301–302) had
already pointed out that, because space and time are coextensive, so
too are the event and the thing: ‘‘the perceptual object we also call the
organism is expressive of certain of the knowable characteristics of the
event which can be exemplified in sense-experience’’ (i.e. the organism
is the event and the event is the organism). Although Woodger phrased
his discussion in terms of the organism, the relation extends transi-
tively to the parts of organisms and to the lineages of which organisms
are parts.
4Patterson’s arguments for equating homology with synapomorphy
devolve to the familiar thesis of pattern cladism. As he stated elsewhere
(Patterson, 1982a, p. 305; our italics), ‘‘[e]very homology characterizes
a group at some level in the hierarchy, and symplesiomorphy and
synapomorphy are terms for homologies that stand in hierarchic
relation: a symplesiomorphy (general character) makes a group, and a
synapomorphy (special character) makes a subgroup. In this light, too,
the rift between [pattern] cladists and [phylogenetic] systematists comes
clearer into focus.’’ As he went on to conclude (p. 306), ‘‘if we are
taught, as we have been, to see that pattern through the spectacles of
evolutionary theory, how could the pattern ever test the theory?’’
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the number of terminals (Siddall and Kluge, 1997). As
such, no special procedure is required to generate
hypotheses of homology; they already exist. Moreover,
as reviewed by Grant and Kluge (2003), the origin of
hypotheses has no bearing on their scientific status or
objective support.
Conceptually, homology refers only to the historical
identity of parts related through a series of evolutionary
transformation events, and to conclude that the refuta-
tion of a hypothesis of homology by the test of character
congruence ‘‘does not invalidate a primary homology
proposition’’ (de Pinna, 1991, p. 373) conflates the
concept of homology with the discovery operations
employed to detect instances of it (Grant, 2002) and
illustrates the difficulties that arise from treating syna-
pomorphy and homology as synonyms. Synapomor-
phies that optimize to different nodes of a most
parsimonious cladogram resulted from different trans-
formation events and are therefore non-homologous at
that level of generality (Farris, 1970), their homology as
independent parts of a more inclusive historical indi-
vidual being beside the point.
The ‘‘duality’’ that de Pinna (1991, p. 372) aimed to
accommodate is not due to different concepts or to
hypothesis ‘‘generation and legitimation’’, but rather to
the fact that the discovery operations employed to test
homology claims and detect historical identity are
attributable to two classes, one involving separate tests
of each transformation series in isolation, the other
involving the combined or multiple test of character
congruence. These two classes of discovery operations
are complementary (Grant, 2002) and are typically
employed sequentially in research cycles, a procedure
that maximizes severity of test and leads to the
progressive elimination of error through reciprocal
illumination (Kluge, 1998, 2003b). However, the com-
bination of both kinds of discovery operations is not
necessary to legitimately test hypotheses of homology.
For some kinds of evidence (e.g. most phenotypic data),
structural and ⁄or developmental complexity may pro-
vide evidence to defensibly choose among competing
hypotheses of homology; those hypotheses that are
refuted in this initial round of testing are never
submitted to the simultaneous test of congruence. For
other kinds of evidence, parts may be so simplified as to
be physically indistinguishable, regardless of their
historical identities (e.g. nucleotides in DNA sequences),
or what evidence that exists may be inadequate to
decisively select one hypothesis over another. Separate
tests of homology are inert in such cases, and only the
test of congruence can lead to an objectively defensible
choice among the competing hypotheses (which is the
rationale behind methods of direct optimization; e.g.
Wheeler, 1996). This decoupling of the two classes of
discovery operations invalidates the claim that hypo-
theses of homology not subjected to the test of congru-
ence are not phylogenetic (Rieppel, 1988; de Pinna,
1991) and obviates the requirement that assessment of
‘‘primary homology’’ necessarily precede assessment of
‘‘secondary homology’’ (de Pinna, 1991). We caution
that this decoupling is not meant as an endorsement
of or justification for decreased testing; both classes of
tests should be applied whenever possible, as this
procedure maximizes severity of test (Kluge, 1998,
2003a,b).
The limited relevance of properties
As mentioned above, characters cannot be conceptu-
alized legitimately as properties, because properties are
abstract, spatio-temporally unrestricted, and immutable,
and are generally conceived as playing a role in
classification, whereby possession of a specified prop-
erty(ies) is both necessary and sufficient for member-
ship in a class (Kluge, 2003b). This suggests that
properties can play no role whatsoever in phylogenetic
systematics, given that it is concerned with concrete,
spatio-temporally restricted, transformable individuals
that are related by virtue of being part of a lineage
system (Lidén, 1990). Indeed, character individuation in
phylogenetics is usually done entirely ostensively, i.e.
through a direct comparison of specimens, photographs,
drawings, recordings, or other renderings, with naming
and description of properties only being used to
communicate findings. Nevertheless, in addition to the
social value of properties in communication, properties
may also be of some cognitive value as descriptors of
variation, if those descriptors are used to delimit test
statements ⁄conditions in the inference of historical
identity ⁄ transformation. Arguably, tests may run the
risk of being ad hoc and their results meaningless unless
relevant properties are specified a priori (i.e. aspects of
things conjectured to have undergone heritable trans-
formation). In this context, properties may facilitate
generalization across particulars, i.e. they may be useful
in defining general test statements. Given that the real
criterion of historical identity—being derived from the
same transformation event—cannot be determined
directly, systematists may infer historical identity indi-
rectly on the basis of observable variation (Hennig,
1966, pp. 93–94; Farris, 1967). Although the very
concept of transformation implies properties (i.e. trans-
formation of some thing into another implies a change
in some property), a single heritable transformation may
entail any number of properties (cf. Hennig, 1966,
pp. 92–93), because the number of properties of both
the original and transformed things is infinite. What is
ultimately proposed as a historical identity relation—a
statement of homology—is, however, a consequence of
both tests of character analysis ⁄reanalysis and character
congruence (Kluge, 2003b).
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The relevance of properties is therefore as delimiters
of test statements in the inference of transformation,
and not as explanatory elements unto themselves. Used
judiciously, they can help to bridge the gap between
observation and inference, and facilitate hypothesis
testing. On the other hand, concepts that identify
similarity as the definiens of character (e.g. Rieppel
and Kearney, 2002) commit category errors, treating
properties as if they were explanans rather than mere
descriptors and conflating intensionally defined class
concepts with ostensively defined individuals. Any real
thing or event has an infinite number of properties
(Grant, 2002; Kluge, 2003b), and care must be taken not
to over-interpret or reify these abstract class concepts
(Frost and Kluge, 1994; Kluge, 2003b). All that matters
in the science of phylogenetic systematics is the inference
of heritable transformation, and properties are not
necessary to achieve that end.
Discussion
In two recent papers on character individuation and
phylogenetic inference, Richards concluded that ‘‘no
character individuation principle identified so far is
adequate’’ (Richards, 2003, p. 264) and, further, that
‘‘[t]he failure to formulate a criterion of character
individuation, raises concerns that character individua-
tion, and therefore the application of parsimony, is either
arbitrary or subjective’’ (Richards, 2002, p. 17). Insofar
as his assessment did not include Hennig’s (1966) concept
of character as transformation series, we are not surprised
by his conclusion. Nor are we surprised by his conclusion
that phenetic approaches that rely on ‘‘mere’’ observation
are unpromising, and that ‘‘[a] satisfactory character
individuation scheme—and character concept—must
surely function to support [the] goal… of the reconstruc-
tion of the branching order of the evolutionary past’’
(Richards, 2003, p. 278). Had Richards considered Hen-
nig’s transformationist views and repeated arguments
against similarity, hemay have been surprised to find that
considerable progress had already been achieved in this
‘‘project worthy of pursuit’’ (p. 278).
Likewise, although we do not deny the role played by
so-called Kuhnian values in the scientific endeavor (see
Grant and Kluge, 2003), this does not mean that
character choice and individuation are necessarily arbi-
trary or subjective and, therefore ‘‘the application of
parsimony depends on persuasion, background, training
and tradition’’ (Richards, 2002, p. 1). Certainly, the
choice to behave rationally is personal (and therefore
subjective), and significant social payoffs may be
obtained from discarding consistency or other cognitive
values, but these observations do nothing to undermine
the claim that the application of phylogenetic parsimony
in a total evidence analysis of equally weighted evidence
minimizes the total number of hypotheses of transforma-
tion required to explain the heritable variation observed
among species and, as such, the most parsimonious
cladogram represents the objectively optimal phylogenetic
theory. Furthermore, the fact that there is the potential
for error in the delimitation of transformation series
does not mean that character individuation is necessarily
subjective or arbitrary. Like any scientific hypothesis,
proposed character-states and the transformation series
through which they are related are open to refutation
and refinement through cycles of empirical testing and
re-testing (Kluge, 2003b).
Practically minded workers are often tempted to
dismiss ontological discussions as purely academic with
no relevance to the day-to-day pursuits of practicing
scientists, preferring instead to adopt an operationalist
perspective. For example, as Brower and Schawaroch
(1996, p. 266; see also Brower, 2000) stated:
‘‘We are not especially concerned with an explicit ontological
definition for homology. Equating homology with synapomor-
phy only foists its metaphysical baggage onto the latter concept.
However, we will claim that, since evolution has nothing to do
with the successful discovery and interpretation of characters,
evolutionary definitions are clearly superfluous. Practically
speaking, homology may not require an operational definition
more complicated than similarity, as ordered by the cladistic
method.’’
However, because scored characters provide the basis
for phylogenetic analysis, the way character is defined
conceptually (ontologically) has a profound effect on all
aspects of phylogenetic inference. As practicing system-
atists are all too aware, the empirical individuation of
each transformation series may engender its own unique
set of problems, and there is no limit to the kinds of
discovery operations and number of tests that can be
brought to bear on a particular hypothesis of historical
identity. Although the present paper is not primarily
concerned with the operational aspects of character
individuation, it is clear that the transformation series
concept of character allows discovery operations and
tests to be assessed for their consistency. Above we
discussed briefly the impact of this concept of character
on the treatment of polymorphism, different kinds of
non-independence, and understanding of homology, but
its effects can also be seen in approaches to multiple
sequence alignment, character weighting, statistical
methods of phylogenetic analysis, and beyond.
The science of phylogenetic systematics has pro-
gressed impressively beyond Hennig’s (1966) original
formulation, both conceptually and operationally. Nev-
ertheless, Hennig’s arguments played an important role
in establishing the analytical framework for modern
systematics, and they represent a key starting point in
the elimination of pattern cladistics and the ‘‘point-and-
click’’ approach to systematics that has taken hold in
recent years (Grant et al., 2003).
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